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Abstract—Recently, we have witnessed the remarkable devel-
opment in high-speed railways around the world. To provide a
robust and fast wireless network for the onboard passengers,
we have earlier proposed smart collaborative networking for
railways (SCN-R). In the realization of SCN-R, its security is
challenged by potential exploitation of authentication vulnerabil-
ities since traditional authentication mechanisms are unsuitable
for scenarios with fast moving objects due to their complex
and relatively timely operations. In this paper, we address this
issue by proposing a new efficient authentication mechanism,
which is based on a new design of chaotic random number
generator (RNG). Comparing with the recent proposal relying
on the precise boundaries of chaotic map state-spaces, our RNG
uses two logistic maps to avoid the time-consuming boundary
location process. The proposed authentication mechanism uses
the RNG to generate and validate the one-time password (OTP).
To support different authentication applications, different lengths
of OTPs can be used to differentiate and identify the applications.
We have implemented our proposed authentication mechanism
under real world conditions with results showing the feasibility
and effectiveness of our authentication mechanism.
Index Terms—Wireless communication, communication system
security, chaos, random number generator, cyber attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the past decade, high-speed railways have been devel-oped rapidly as a green transportation system. In China, for
example, the total length of business high-speed railway has
reached 21,000 kilometers, and it transports double the number
of passengers than what airplane transports [1]. Furthermore,
the electric high-speed train is energy efficiency. Its energy
cost is about 13,104 kJ per passenger per kilometer, which is
only about 8.5% of the airplane [2].
Since the commute time is usually long, passengers demand
Internet connectivity to manage their daily activities during
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the journey. However, the travelling speed of the high-speed
train (typically 350 kilometers per hour) leads to unstable
wireless connectivity. Although the modern cellular networks
support high-speed movement, their actual performance will
be compromised when the moving speed exceeds 120 kilo-
meters per hour, due to frequent handovers and reconnections
[3]. To improve the onboard user experience, some advanced
radio access networks have been proposed [4-6]. However,
they require updating the roadside units which will be both
time and resource consuming.
To build a robust wireless network for the passengers
without expensive road side unit updates, we have proposed
smart collaborative networking for railway (SCN-R) [7]. The
SCN-R introduces two types of equipment. One is the onboard
smart mobile router (SMR), which supports various wireless
network interfaces, such as WCDMA (3G) and TDD/FDD-
LTE (4G). The other one is the ground side smart access
router (SAR), which serves as a proxy for the SMR and its
main responsibility is tracking and communicating with the
SMR. In SCN-R, users connect to the SMR directly inside
the train. Then the SMR delivers the user data to the SAR
using several wireless interfaces concurrently. It can select the
wireless interfaces dynamically according to their link status.
The SAR further relays the data to the Internet and passes
the returning data back to the SMR. It also tracks the current
wireless interface IP addresses of the SMR by monitoring its
received packets.
In the realization of SCN-R [8, 9], we made an important
observation. While adding wireless interfaces on the SMR
generally improves the reliability of SCN-R, it has limited
effect once the wireless interfaces exceed a certain number. In
fact, the reliability of SCN-R depends not only on the wireless
links between the SMR and the RAN, but also the wired
links in the radio access network (RAN), the core network
(CN) and the public network (PN). The unexpected delay
on the wired links causes disordered packets. Some delayed
packets may still carry outdated information particularly the
wireless interface IP addresses of the SMR. This outdated
information may confuse SAR and cause delivery of packets
to incorrect wireless interface IP address. Confusion may be
created intentionally too. For example, replay/spoofing attacks
from the public network can disrupt the tracking of a moving
SMR. They can aggravate the fluctuation of data delivery delay
by replaying legitimate data or fabricating packets that indicate
wrong wireless interface IP addresses. On the SMR side,
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Fig. 1. The life-time of wireless interface IP addresses in a high speed train.
resource limitation is the main vulnerability. A simple UDP
flood attack launched within the public network can exhaust
the limited wireless bandwidth through the wired links. They
may overload the SMR and even block returning services by
flooding lots of non-purposeful data to the SMR. Therefore,
SCN-R requires an adequate access control to identify and de-
fend against any malicious activities that can lead to perplexing
delay observation in the SAR or excessive non-purposeful data
receiving in the SMR. An efficient authentication mechanism
is therefore a foundation of dealing with the above problems.
The motivation of this paper is that the existing authentica-
tion mechanisms are unsuitable for SCN-R. While there are
many robust authentication systems implemented in the real-
world, these authentication processes often require complex
reversible cryptographic operations, such as the symmetric
encryption and asymmetric encryption. If the SMR and the
SAR require to carry out such cryptographic operations in the
authentication process, cyber attackers can exhaust their com-
putation resources by flooding with excessive fabricated au-
thentication requests. While seeking light to reversible encryp-
tion free authentication mechanisms counter such resource-
depletion attacks, they require frequent message exchanges
which is unsuitable for the high-speed train scenario. For
example, as shown in Fig. 1, the life-time of an IP address
is about 15 seconds in a moving high-speed train typically.
Whereas, the average round-trip time (RTT) is about 1.2 sec-
onds when the IP address changes (i.e. when an authentication
is required) [8]. Therefore, more rounds of message exchanges
leads to obviously longer authentication process and lower
wireless network utilization in the high-speed train scenario.
In this paper, we propose an efficient authentication mech-
anism for SCN-R based on chaotic systems and irreversible
cryptographic operations. The chaotic systems generate the
OTP in the authentication message and the irreversible cryp-
tographic operations protect the authentication message from
being tampered. To achieve this, we first design a novel
random number generator using chaotic maps that does not
involve in the complex chaotic map state-space partition which
is present in existing designs. Then we deploy a pair of
synchronous random number generators in both SMR and
SAR, which generate and check the OTP in the authentication
message. In this way, we avoid the need to use reversible
cryptographic operations and reduce the processing complexity
and communication overheads. Finally, to improve the security
property of the proposed authentication mechanism, we further
leverage the irreversible cryptographic operations to protect
the authentication message from being tampered. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
 We have proposed a novel chaos-based RNG and prove
the randomness of its output. Comparing with the existing
designs, our proposal is more efficient since it avoids the
complex chaotic map state-space partition process.
 We have designed an efficient authentication mechanism
for SCN-R by adopting a pair of the proposed RNGs.
Comparing with traditional irreversible encryption based
authentication mechanisms, it shows a better performance
when dealing with missing OTP and the brute-force
attack.
 We have shown the feasibility and effectiveness of our
proposed method by implementing and testing the pro-
posed authentication mechanism in both static and fast
moving scenarios using the SMR and SAR devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the recent progress in the vehicular authentication.
In Section III, we review SCN-R and two types of cyber
attacks in SCN-R. We also provide the basic knowledge
of chaotic map and chaos-based authentication. In Section
IV, we propose the novel RNG using the logistic map. The
authentication mechanism and the implementation details are
provided in Section V. In Section VI, we show the experiments
and results of our proposal in both static and high speed
moving scenarios. Finally, we draw important conclusions in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Asymmetric Encryption Based Authentication Mechanisms
in Vehicular Networks
Vehicular networks (e.g. vehicular ad hoc networks) are
considered to be an important application scenario for the
future wireless communication. To improve the authentication
efficient between cars and roadside units, several promising
methods have been proposed.
In most of the authentication mechanisms, the vehicle signs
and verifies the authentication message using the traditional
public key infrastructures (PKIs) [10-12]. To shorten the length
of keys and simplify the cryptographic operations, the elliptic
curve cryptosystem (ECC)-based PKI is widely used apart
from the RSA-based PKI [11]. For different authentication
message receivers, they need to hold a large number of private
keys and execute the corresponding amount of cryptographic
operations [12]. Recently, a proposal of group signature and
verification [13, 14] is viewed as a promising way to reduce
the number of keys and improve the authentication efficiency.
In the group signature and verification mechanisms, a group
of vehicles share group public keys and each group member
can sign authentication messages on behalf of the other in
the same group. However, the main challenge for such a pro-
posal lies in the group membership maintenance of dynamic
group members and time-consuming certificate revocation list
checking. To address these issues, Vijayakumar et al. [15]
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attempt to update the group member list and key settings in
a computationally efficient way, in which subscribed vehicles
are treated as authorized primary users and they are free from
group key negotiation process. Whereas the rest of secondary
and unauthorized vehicles require group keys from the trusted
authority through the primary users. Besides, Zhu et al. [16]
propose replacing the certificate revocation list with a hash
message authentication code to shorten the time in signature
verification process.
As for the efficient authentication between the vehicle and
the roadside unit, the batch verification and the hierarchical
authentication are the most adopted techniques. Proposals
using the batch verification [17-20] allow the roadside unit
to verify multiple authentication messages at the same time,
which reduces the overhead and increases the throughout.
However, since in these proposals, the verification is processed
in batch, responses are released after an adequate number
of authentication messages received for processing, delay is
expected especially when there are few authentication mes-
sages. Besides, the batch verification proposals are generally
susceptible to attacks which inject messages with false in-
formation to disrupt the verification. To counter this kind of
attacks, Liu et al. [21] propose a hierarchical authentication
scheme to reduce the workload of the centralized roadside
unit. They introduce proxy vehicles which help to verify the
authentication messages for nearby vehicles. Then the verified
messages are aggregated and forwarded to the roadside unit.
Similarly, Zhang et al. [22] focus on combining the batch
verification and the hierarchical authentication. They attempt
to reduce the waiting time of the vehicle by regulating the
authentication message generation.
We note that most of the existing authentication mechanisms
rely on the complex asymmetric cryptographic operations.
Therefore they are generally susceptible to the resource-
depletion attack. These mechanisms are not suitable for our
scenario since the SAR has to process a large number of
certificates for the SMRs which represents a bottleneck in the
design. Besides, the timely requirement for verification due to
high travelling speed of SMR does not permit the use of batch
verification and the hierarchical authentication in SCN-R.
B. Symmetric Encryption and Hash Chain Based Authentica-
tion Mechanisms
In order to simplify the authentication process and reduce
communication overhead, many proposals use symmetric en-
cryption instead of asymmetric encryption to code the authen-
tication message. As designed in some proposals [23, 24], the
asymmetric encryption is only responsible for the transition
of symmetric keys. The symmetric keys are then used in the
authentication process. Although such proposals show great
advantage in communication overhead control [25] compared
with the pure asymmetric encryption based authentication
mechanisms, they are still vulnerable to the resource-depletion
attack.
To make the authentication mechanism free from reversible
cryptographic operations and resource-depletion attacks, some
proposals [26-30] attempt to design authentication mechanism-
s without the symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryp-
tion. The common working principle of these proposals is
summarized in Fig. 2. They use the hash chain to generate
the dynamic one-time password. We denote y = h(x) to be
the secure hash function, where x is the input in form of
arbitrary size and y is the output in form of a fixed size. Then
a secure h has the property that computing y with given x is
simple while finding x with given y is extremely difficult.
As shown in Fig. 2, the access controller first chooses an
initial seed s and a system number N , and sends them to
the access user. Then the access user authenticates itself by
using a sequence of one-time passwords pi = hN i(s). The
differences between the studies [26-30] lie in the design of
h(x) and s. Typically in vehicular ad hoc networks, Vighnesh
et al. [31] propose a detail authentication mechanism based on
hash chains, in which each vehicle owns an unique master key
as its seed s and the authentication center knows the master
key. In their proposal, the system number N is randomly
selected by the vehicle and transmitted to the authentication
center in ciphertext.
The main security issue of using hash chain to generate
and check OTPs is that the OTPs are chained. Due to the
connections between OTPs, when an OTP is missing, the chain
is broken, and the authentication process needs to renegotiate
a new initial seed S and system number N . For example,
as shown in Fig. 2, when p0 is missing in the authentication
process, the access controller will fail to check p1. Similarly,
all the OTPs generated after p1 will also be invalidated
until a new initialization state is established between the
access user and the access controller. In fact, the missing
of OTPs happens quite commonly in high speed moving
scenarios due to unstable wireless link status, which leads to
an unexpected increase of communication overhead and lower
wireless bandwidth utilization in SCN-R. Besides, the secret
hash chains are challenged by the modern collision attack,
which is well known as the birthday attack. Since knowing
massive history OTPs means knowing massive input-output
pairs of the secret hash chains, attackers can disrupt the hash
chain based authentication process by finding the collision
(e.g. finding an illegal OTP p01, which satisfies p
0
1 6= p1 but
h(p01) = p0) or cracking the secret hash chains (i.e. finding
unused legal OTPs). Based on that, attackers may deceive the
authentication controller using the modified OTPs.
Access user Access controller
...
p0=h
N
(s)
P1=h
N-1
(s)
pN-1=h(s)
p0=h
N
(s),  OTP correct
h(p1)=p0, OTP correct
h(pN-1)=pN-2, OTP correct
s, N
p0
p1
pN-1
Fig. 2. The authentication process of the hash chain based mechanisms.
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Fig. 3. The working principle of SCN-R.
III. SCN-R AND ITS SECURITY CHALLENGES
A. The Working Principle of SCN-R
We first illustrate the operation of SCN-R by using an
example given in Fig. 3. In our example, an onboard SMR
initially connect to the Internet via 3G cellular network. It
encapsulates the user data with the IP address assigned by
the NodeB. With the movement of the train carrying a SMR,
the SMR has moved out of the coverage of the 3G cellular
network and detected a 4G cellular network. It quickly makes
connection to the eNodeB and begins to packetize the user data
with the newly assigned IP address. The SAR will monitor
such outer IP address changes of the encapsulated packets
when it fetches services for the user. The SAR is aware of
the movement of the SMR and its current active IP address.
Therefore, the SAR can return the services to the latest IP
address of the moving SMR. In this way, SCN-R provides a
stable and fast wireless network for the onboard user.
B. Security Challenges and Attack Models
In evaluating the robustness of SCN-R, we noticed several
vulnerabilities in the process that can compromise the SAR
and the SMR. We discuss the challenges in the aspect of
content and communications as follows.
The message exchange between SAR and SMR can
be sniffed and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks can be
launched. Authentication is a means to defend MITM attacks.
Here we introduce an authentication procedure to defend such
attacks. While there are many existing robust authentication
solutions, the lifetime of a session in our scenario is very
short as discussed and shown in Fig. 1, we seek lightweight
approach to fulfill the authentication need. However, vulnera-
bilities exist in the current lightweight authentication solutions
such as hash-based OTP authentication. The hashed content
can be sniffed, cracked, and used for attacks in the current and
future sessions. Attacking the current session will be challeng-
ing given the very short lifetime of a session and the significant
Movementove ent
SMRSMR
NodeB eNodeB
MME
SGW/PGW
RNC
SGSN
GGSN
SAR
Server
PN
RAN/CN
On board
Attack
packets that jam
normal traffic.
Replay/Spoofing
attacks
UDP flood attacks
Attack
packets that
hijack normal
traffic.
Fig. 4. Two security challenges in SCN-R.
effort to crack the OTPs. However, attacking a future session
is possible if the OTPs are chained, as a result, future OTPs
can be derived by sniffing and cracking observable OTPs. Our
solution particularly addresses this by using OTPs that are
not chained. Because OTPs are independent, observing current
OTPs does not provide any useful information to derive any
future OTPs. Direct attack on the contents is discouraged with
our solution.
In terms of communications, the robustness of SCN-R
demands the SAR to properly track the IP address of all SMRs.
However, due to the handover, excessive delay presence in the
RAN, CN or PN may compromise the packet delivery order
and cause tracking confusion in the SAR. This issue may occur
when an SMR is disconnected from an out of range network
and reestablish a connection to another network. As shown
in the example illustrated in Fig. 4, a new wireless interface
IP address assigned by the eNodeB in 4G cellular network
will take over the communication replacing the previous IP
address. However, packets using the previous outdated IP
address may suffer from excessive delay and arrive at the
SAR later than those packets using the newly assigned IP
address. The later arrival of the packets with outdated IP
address may cause the SAR to switch to the outdated IP
address for subsequent communications. Apart from attacking
the communication handshake procedure, it is also possible
to attack the communication resources. Flooding attack is a
common attack.
Since deriving full knowledge of the OTPs is discouraged,
we shall focus on attacks that do not rely on the knowledge of
OTPs. We have identified replay, spoofing and flooding attacks
are key threats which are discussed in the following.
1) Replay and Spoofing Attacks: The tracking of IP ad-
dress may be compromised deliberately. A replay or spoofing
attacker can actively pollute the data traffic to prevent the
SAR from tracking the current IP address of the SMR. The
attacker first listens to the packets from the SMR to the SAR.
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Then the attacker may attempt to fabricate packets with a fake
wireless interface IP address (the outer source IP in Fig. 3) and
send such packets to the SAR pretending to be a legitimated
handover event in SMR. Consequently, as shown in Fig. 4, the
subsequent packets will be delivered to the attacker and the
communication may be hijacked. To address the robustness
issue of SCN-R, an authentication mechanism is required. An
authentication mechanism gives the ability to SAR to check
the correctness of packets in terms of time and content.
2) Flooding Attacks: For the SMR, due to its limited
wireless bandwidth, it is vulnerable to flooding attack. Such
an attack may be launched from the public network. Since the
SAR returns the Internet services through the CN, attackers
can listen to the links between the SAR and the CN. When
they obtain the outer source and destination IP addresses, as
shown in Fig. 4, they may flood handshake-free UDP packets
to the SMR using the obtained IP addresses pretending that the
packets come from the ground side SAR. These UDP packets
will be sent to the SMR, occupying the limited wireless band-
width and choking the delivery of legitimate packets. Since
the CNs are unable to identify the non-legitimate traffic, the
packets will be delivered and identified as useless at the SMR.
To protect the SMR limited wireless bandwidth resource, the
SMR should promptly inform the SAR about such an event so
that the SAR can respond to invalidate the malicious actions.
In this case, the SMR requires an authentication process to
report the incident securely.
C. Chaotic Map and Chaos-Based Authentication
As discussed in the previous section, hash chain offers a
light weight solution to achieve authentication. However, se-
curity weaknesses exist. To address the security vulnerabilities
of the hash chain, some recent proposals [32-34] attempt to
use the chaotic map to generate dynamic one-time passwords.
The overview of the authentication process is given in Fig.
5. We denote y = f(x) to be the chaotic map. Then f(x)
has the property that, even small difference d lies between
two initial states x0 and x0+ d, the outcomes of fN (x0) and
fN (x0 + d) will be diverging obviously with the increase of
the iteration time N . In other words, it is extremely difficult
to determine x0 given N and fN (x0), and difficult to obtain
f(x) using finite pairs of x0 and fN (x0). As shown in Fig.
5, the access controller first chooses an initial state x0 and an
iteration time N , and it then sends them to the access user. The
access user authenticates itself by using the output of the secret
chaotic map fN (x0). When the access controller receives a
Access user Access controller
...
p0=f
N
(x0) p0=f
N
(x0),  OTP correct
x0, N
p0
Update x0, N
p1=f
N
(x0) p1=f
N
(x0),  OTP correctp1
Update x0, N
Fig. 5. The authentication process of the chaotic map based proposals
request, it executes the same task with the access user. Once
the request is verified, the access controller updates x0 and N
on the access user. Focusing on applications for mobile users,
Chankasame et al. propose a novel chaotic map and design
an authentication mechanism[35]. The message that need to
be sent is viewed as the input x0 of the chaotic map. Their
authentication mechanism uses 8 chaotic maps y = f(x) to
generate different highly random outputs fN (x0). Instead of
building a RNG, the authors leverage hash functions to convert
the output fN (x0) into fixed length. However, these proposals
usually require frequent intercommunication to update the
initial state on the access user.
Clearly, the existing authentication mechanisms in their
current form are unsuitable for our considered scenario. In
this paper we make an attempt to improve the authentication
mechanism by addressing these weaknesses. In particular, we
improve the chaotic map-based approach by further reduce the
intercommunication overhead to achieve a lighter and faster
process.
IV. CHAOS-BASED RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR
In this section, we provide a new random number genera-
tor, which is the foundation of designing our authentication
mechanism. The random number generator is widely used
in authentication and synchronization applications. Traditional
random number generators rely on the unpredictable physical
process, such as the thermal noise in the circuit or the white
noise in the radio. However, in the real world operation,
the unpredictable physical processes are often difficult to
control. Recently, deterministic chaotic systems are widely
discussed to be used as the information sources in the random
number generator. Stojanovski et al. [36, 37] have provided
a comprehensive analysis of the randomness in deterministic
chaos. Particularly, they have proved that many chaotic maps
(e.g. logistic map) can be utilized to generate random numbers.
According to the studies of Stojanovski et al. [36, 37], given
a chaotic map f : S ! S (where S is the state space of f )
and an expected output symbol set O = fO1; :::; Omg, before
it can be used to generate random numbers, a partition of S
(we denote it as  = f1; :::; mg) should be calculated first.
The partition needs to meet the following conditions8><>:
Si=m
i=1 i = S
i \ j = ?
8i; j P[f(x) 2 i] = P[f(x) 2 j ]:
(1)
For example, if we use the logistic map xn+1 = rxn(1  xn)
to generate a series of binary random numbers (i.e., O1 =
1; O2 = 0;m = 2), we need to find the boundary between
region 1 and region 2 which satisfies (1). The parameter r
decides the chaos property of xn when the initial state x0 is
selected. When r is set to 4, for almost all initial states, the
outputs can go into chaos quickly. Then we decide the nth
random number in the output queue (OQ) as follow.
OQn =
(
O1 f(xn) 2 1
O2 f(xn) 2 2:
(2)
0018-9545 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2019.2920988, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
6
Algorithm 1: The proposed random number generator
Input: parameter r = 4, initial states x10 and x20
(x1o 6= x20), the number of iterations n
Output: A series of random numbers
OQ = fOQ1; :::; OQng
for i = 1; i 6 n; i++ do
x1i = f1(x
1
i 1) = rx
1
i 1(1  x1i 1);
x2i = f2(x
2
i 1) = rx
2
i 1(1  x2i 1);
if x1i == x2i then
while x1i == x2i is true do
temp = f2(x
2
i );
x2i = f2(temp);
end
end
if x1i > x2i then
OQi = O1;
end
if x1i < x2i then
OQi = O2;
end
end
However, it should be noted that we cannot use finite
iteration results to calculate the precise boundaries between
the partition regions in S, since the boundaries change with
the increase of the iterations. Besides, although the iteration
results of the chaotic map are distributed randomly in S,
their distribution is uneven. That explains why the boundary
between the two partition regions is not always equal to half
of the supremum of S.
In order to find a solution to generate random numbers
without the calculation of precise boundaries, we propose Al-
gorithm 1 using two logistic maps with the same r but different
initial state x0. We denote one logistic map f1 : S ! S as
the master map, the other logistic map f2 : S ! S as the
slave map. The initial state of the master map is x10 and that
of the slave map is x20. For each iteration, both the master
map and the slave map calculate their outputs x1i = f
i
1(x
1
0)
and x2i = f
i
2(x
2
0). Then we decide the output binary of the
iteration as follow.
OQn =
(
O1 x
1
i > x
2
i
O2 x
1
i < x
2
i :
(3)
Since computer programs calculate iteration results with a
limited accuracy, the inaccuracy may lead to the condition
where x1i = x
2
i while iterating the chaotic maps. To avoid
such an issue in the process, in our design given in Algorithm
1, the slave map iterates with extra times until x1i 6= x2i .
In the following, we shall show the randomness property of
our proposed algorithm. Precisely, we need to prove that
P(OQi = O1) = P(OQi = O2) = 0:5; 1 6 i 6 n: (4)
For the master map and the slave map, we assume that 1 =
f11; :::; 1mg and 2 = f21; :::; 2mg are their partitions in the
state spaces. According to (1), they satisfy that
81i ; 2i P[f1(x) 2 1i ] = P[f2(x) 2 2i ] =
1
m
: (5)
Since f1 and f2 have the same r and the same number of
iterations n, when n ! 1, the boundaries of the regions
in 1 are the same with that in 2. For each iteration (e.g.,
ith), the corresponding iteration results f i1(x
1
0) and f
i
2(x
2
0) are
independent, and they fall into two regions. Then O1 occurs
with the probability where
P(OQi = O1) = P(x1i > x2i )
= lim
m!1
m 1X
k1=1
P[f i1(x10) 2 k1 ]
mX
k2=k1+1
P[f i2(x20) 2 k2 ]
= lim
m!1
m  1
2m
= 0:5:
(6)
Similarly, O2 occurs with the probability where
P(OQi = O2) = P(x1i < x2i )
= lim
m!1
mX
k1=2
P[f i1(x10) 2 k1 ]
k1 1X
k2=1
P[f i2(x20) 2 k2 ]
= lim
m!1
m  1
2m
= 0:5:
(7)
V. AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM AND IMPLEMENTATION
DETAILS
In this section, we first provide the proposed authentication
mechanism. Then we describe the implementation details that
address the aforementioned security challenges described in
Section III.
A. Authentication Mechanism
1) Normal Operation: Fig. 6 shows the working principle
of the proposed authentication mechanism. The authentication
mechanism is based on deterministic chaotic maps. The un-
derlying idea is to build two same random number generators.
One resides inside the SMR and the other one resides inside
the SAR. To make sure their outputs are synchronous, the
SMR and the SAR use the same iteration step and accuracy.
More specifically, the entire procedure consists of two
phases, i.e. the initialization process and the authentication
process. In the initialization process, the SAR sends a pair
of secret initial states (x10 and x
2
0) to the SMR. For different
SMRs, their secret initial states are unique. With the public
chaotic maps (f1 and f2), the SMR and the SAR build their
own random number generators as described in Section IV.
In the authentication process, using the secret initial state x10
and x20, the SMR first iterates the public chaotic map f1 and
f2 with 2N times, thus getting the N -bit main OTP (MOTP,
e.g. p1 and p2) and the N -bit secondary OTP (SOTP, e.g.
sp1 and sp2) from its random number generator. Next the
SMR sends the MOTP to the SAR while holding the SOTP.
The SAR checks the MOTP with its own random number
generator and calculates the corresponding SOTP by executing
the same task. Finally, to acknowledge the correctness of
the MOTP, the SAR returns the SOTP to the SMR as an
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SAR
p1=RNG1(x
1
0, x
2
0,N)={OQ1,Ă,OQN},
sp1=RNG1(x
1
N, x
2
N,N)={OQ1,Ă,OQN},
TOTF=0.
{OQ1,Ă,OQN}=RNG2(x10, x20,N),
OTP p1 correct,
sp1=RNG2(x
1
N, x
2
N,N)={OQ1,Ă,OQN},
x10=f1
2N(x10), x
2
0=f2
2N(x20).{OQ1,Ă,OQN}=RNG1(x1N, x2N,N),
OTP sp1 correct,
x10=f1
2N(x10), x
2
0=f2
2N(x20).
p2=RNG1(x
1
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2
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1
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1
N, x
2
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2
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2N(x20).
p3=RNG1(x
1
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2
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1
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1
2N*TOTF, x
2
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1
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The 1st authentication
The 2nd authentication
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Fig. 6. The authentication mechanism based on the proposed random number
generator.
acknowledgement. As shown in Fig. 6, both the SMR and
the SAR update their initial states with step 2N (i.e. the
x10 = f
2N
1 (x
1
0) and x
2
0 = f
2N
2 (x
2
0) shown in Fig. 6) once
the authentication is finished. The updated initial states can be
used for the subsequent authentication.
2) Case 1: OTP Transmission Failure: One main challenge
with the high-speed movement scenario is the unstable wire-
less connectivity leading to the failure of packet delivery.
Packet loss may occur during the authentication procedure.
The failure to deliver messages during the authentication pro-
cedure directly affects the synchronization between the SMR
and the SAR. This may affect the judgement of the SAR and
make the SAR fail to identify the subsequent legitimate OTPs
when an earlier one is missing. To improve the robustness of
synchronization, we introduce additional message to assist the
process synchronization. In particular, we use an 8-bit value to
record the number of time that OTP transmission fails (TOTF).
For example, as shown in Fig. 6, when the SAR misses a
legitimate MOTP and the SMR receives no acknowledgement
(in the 3rd authentication), the SMR tries a fresh MOTP, and
announces TOTF= 1. As the SAR revives the fresh MOTP, it
first iterates the public maps 2N  TOTF times to update its
initial states. Then it checks the fresh MOTP and calculates
the corresponding SOTP as depicted in Fig. 6. When the
authentication process is completed, the SMR and the SAR
updates their initial states with 2N  (TOTF + 1) steps. As
for missing SOTP, upon detection, the SMR simply uses a new
pair of MOTP and SOTP to launch a new authentication.
Since the attackers can hardly know which OTP is missing
on the unstable links between the SMR and the SAR, it is
difficult for them to re-send the missing OTP exactly and
massively. In this case, even when an attacker re-sends p3
SMR
SAR
MD
SOTP
Outer IP 
header
Inner IP 
header
MOTP TOTF SOTP
Outer IP 
header
Inner IP 
header
MOTP TOTF MD
Outer IP 
header
Inner IP 
header
SOTP
1
2
3
4
Fig. 7. Preventing the authentication message from being tampered.
and TOTF= 0 to the SAR before the 4th authentication, the
authentication packets will be invalidated unless they carry the
correct packet headers because of the MD fields shown in the
following Case 2. Then the SAR will return sp3 to the SMR,
consequently the missing OTP is filled by the attacker.
3) Case 2: Authentication Tampering: Besides serving as
the authentication acknowledgement, the SOTP is also de-
signed to protect the MOTP and TOTF from being tampered.
Since the MOTP and TOTF are sent in plaintext, attackers
may intercept the transmission and replace the IP headers or
TOTF in order to disrupt the authentication process. While
the potential of such an attack is very low due to the high-
speed movement of the train which creates a challenging
environment for the attack to be success, a simple solution
exists to counter the attack which makes it worthwhile to
implement. We use an irreversible encryption algorithm (e.g.
MD5) to counter the attack. As shown in Fig. 7, when the
SMR receives the MOTP and the SOTP from its random
number generator, it calculates the message digest (MD) taking
consideration of the IP headers, the MOTP, TOTF and the
SOTP. Then the SMR replaces the SOTP with the MD before
it sends the authentication packets to the SAR. Since attackers
do not have the SOTP, they cannot falsify the authentication
packets. The SOTP can be transmitted in plaintext, since
it does not provide any useful information for attackers to
interfere the authentication process and derive any MOTP or
SOTP that are used in the subsequent sessions.
The strength of this authentication mechanism is due to the
property of chaotic maps, which is sensitive to the initial states.
Even if eavesdroppers collect history OTPs and the public
chaotic maps, without the precise secret initial states, the future
N -bit OTPs cannot be derived directly. Exhaustive OTP search
may be possible but it is extremely time consuming especially
when N is large. To achieve a satisfactory security level,
the recommended N is usually larger than 128 [38]. As for
the security property of adopting MD5 algorithm, we believe
it is adequate for our scenario. This is because firstly, the
length of the input in our mechanism is larger than 256 bits
(i.e. the total length of the MOTP and the SOTP) which is
sufficiently large enough to discourage an attack. According
to the commercial MD5 crack website [39], a real-time crack
service is available for only inputs of 100 bits or shorter.
Secondly, although the commercial MD5 crack website can
break over 90% MD5 encrypted message that is longer than
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100 bits, the time required is around one hour which is much
longer than the lifetime of the wireless interface IP addresses
in our high speed moving scenario which is usually lesser than
20 seconds. The lifetime of our OTP stays within the lifetime
of a wireless interface IP address. Finally, unlike the OTPs
generated by hash chains, our OTPs are not chained. In other
words, even attackers can record the history MD5-encrypted
OTPs and eventually crack them, the history of OTPs does not
provide any useful information to derive any future OTP.
We recognized that our authentication mechanism can be
further enhanced in several aspects. An immediate enhance-
ment is to consider modern message digest algorithm, such
as SHA-160 and SHA-256 to replace MD5. However, due
to the time-sensitive authentication process in SCN-R, some
of the robust but complex message digest algorithms may
not be appropriate and demand further investigation. Another
enhancement is to remove the MOTP field in the authentication
packets sent from the SMR as shown in Fig. 7. This keeps the
OTPs further away from eavesdroppers and further improves
the security of our proposed solution.
B. Defending the Cyber Attacks Using the Proposed Authen-
tication Mechanism
Fig. 8 depicts the implementation environment of our pro-
posed authentication mechanism. In the real world operation,
the SMR can send different lengths of OTPs for different
authentication applications.
Movementove ent
SMRSMR
NodeB eNodeB
MME
SGW/PGW
RNC
SGSN
GGSN
SAR
Server
PN
RAN/CN
On board
Authentication
packets that
claim a legal
or illegal IP
addressReplay/Spoofing
attacks
UDP flood attacks
ELW
273
ELW
273
Fig. 8. The implementation details of the proposed authentication mechanism.
To authenticate a new wireless interface IP address and
prevent the replay/spoofing attacks, the SMR sends four i-
dentical authentication packets when it decides to use a new
IP address. The authentication packets are constructed by an
outer IP header (which includes the new wireless interface IP
address of the SMR), an inner IP header (which indicates the
SAR is the final destination) and a 128-bit MOTP. Once the
SAR receives and confirms an authentication, it records the
new wireless interface IP address as a legitimate one of the
SMR. Then the SMR receives the acknowledgment from the
SAR (which contains the SOTP shown in Fig. 7), and starts to
forward user data using the new wireless interface IP address.
When the SAR receives a series of delayed or attack packets
using the outdated or fake IP address of the SMR, since these
packets do not carry fresh MOTPs, the SAR will immediately
detect that their outer IP address is invalid. This will prevent
any third party who has not got enough knowledge to generate
a correct OTP from fabricating authentication packets to the
SAR. As a result, the tracking of the SMR can be protected.
To authenticate a compromised wireless interface IP address
and mitigate the UDP flood attacks, the SMR sends four same
authentication packets when it monitors an increasing pro-
portion of not-purposeful packets. The authentication packets
are constructed by an outer IP header (which includes the
compromised interface IP address of the SMR), an inner IP
header (which indicates the SAR is the final destination) and
a 160-bit MOTP. Once the SAR receives and confirms the
message, it quickly abandons the existing wireless interface
IP address which has been compromised, and redirects data to
other available interfaces.
Both the MOTP and the SOTP are the output of the RNG.
Therefore, to save the computation cost in the authentication
process, the SMR and the SAR can use their RNGs to
prepare enough outputs and store them locally before the
authentication begins.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To test the proposed RNG and authentication mechanism,
we conduct a series of experiments in both static and high
speed moving environments. We also compare our authentica-
tion mechanism with two existing reversible encryption free
schemes.
A. Experiment and Result in Static Environment
In the static environment, we use our developed SMR shown
in Fig. 9 and our SAR deployed in Alibaba Cloud [40]. In the
experiments, we install three 3G/4G wireless interfaces (i.e.
CMCC TD-LTE, CUCC FDD-LTE and CTCC EV-DO) in the
SMR.
Fig. 9. The used SMR in the static environment.
First, we test the new wireless interface IP authentica-
tion mechanism, which is designed to defend against re-
play/spoofing attacks to SCN-R. In this experiment, to launch
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a real attack to the SAR, some earlier received packets on
the ingress of the SAR are replayed to Alibaba Cloud from a
laptop (i.e. the attacker) in our laboratory. At the same time,
a normal user attempts to retrieve live videos from a public
video site using the SMR shown in Fig. 9. The attack packets
last for 60 seconds. We collect statistics in the attack and the
adjacent time periods (also 60 seconds).
Figs. 10(a) and (b) show the wireless bandwidth utilization
between the SMR and the RAN without and with the use of
our proposed authentication mechanism respectively. As can
be seen in Fig. 10(a), the repeated packets cause the SAR
failing to trace the correct wireless interface IP address and
failing to return the videos to the user. With our proposed au-
thentication mechanism, when the SAR checks the IP address
changes with the OTPs in the payload, the attack packets fail
to hijack the normal traffic as shown in Fig. 10(b).
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Fig. 10. Without and with the use of the new wireless interface IP
authentication mechanism, the fluctuation of the wireless bandwidth between
the SMR and the SAR in the static environment.
To have a deeper insight to the attack, we count the packet
loss rate of the wireless interfaces on the SMR in Fig 11. As
can be seen in Fig. 11(a) showing the packet loss rate without
using our proposed authentication mechanism, the repeated
packets first interrupt the CMCC TDD-LTE wireless interface
and push the packet loss rate up to around 30% at the 21th
time slot, then they compromise the CUCC FDD-LTE wireless
interface and bring the packet loss rate to around 27% at the
31th time slot. Such high packet loss rates eventually cut off
the legitimate live video service. In contrast, the new wireless
interface IP authentication mechanism prevents the replay
attacks and keeps the packet loss rate within the acceptable
range shown in Fig. 11(b).
The corresponding RTT statistics of this experiment are
summarized in Fig. 12. For the case without our proposed
authentication mechanism, the repeated packets mislead the
video services to a wrong destination (i.e. the attacker), the
requests from the SMR fail to receive their response in time.
During the simulated attack, as shown in Fig. 12(a), the
RTT of the CMCC TDD-LTE wireless interface increases
drastically to around 900ms and the RTT of the CUCC FDD-
LTE increases drastically to just over 800ms. These suddent
increase in RTT affects many applications especially those
involving in delivering real-time packets such as live video.
Fig. 12(b) shows the benefit of the authentication mechanism
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Fig. 11. Without and with the use of the new wireless interface IP
authentication mechanism, the fluctuation of the packet loss rate in the static
environment. The length of the time slot is 3 seconds.
where RTT remains low throughout the experiment.
We can see that, even both the normal packets and the
authentication packets are repeated by the attacker, they cannot
interfere the tracking of the SMR since the authentication
packets can only be used once. The repeated authentication
packets have no effect on the SAR apart from indicating to the
SAR that the communications may be under certain attacks.
Second, we test the effectiveness of the authentication mech-
anism against flooding attacks to the SMR. In this experiment,
to launch a UDP flood attack to the SMR, we rent a server
in Alibaba Cloud and deploy an application to continuingly
send UDP data to a single wireless interface while a normal
user is watching live videos using the SMR. The attack rate
is set to higher than the upper limit of the bandwidth of the
wireless interface. In the experiment, according to our test,
for the CMCC TDD-LTE or the CUCC FDD-LTE wireless
interface, the upper limit of the bandwidth is about 50Mbps.
Therefore, we set the attack rate to be 60Mbps. The flooding
of UDP packets lasts for 60 seconds.
Without the authentication mechanism, we observe from
Fig. 13(a) that the UDP data consumes more than 95% of
the bandwidth between the SMR and the RAN while the
user data only utilizes about 5%. Even the live videos are
not interrupted under the flooding of UDP packets, the UDP
packets cost additional bandwidth and computing resources.
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Fig. 12. Without and with the use of the new wireless interface IP authenti-
cation mechanism, the fluctuation of the RTT in the static environment. The
length of the time slot is 3 seconds.
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Fig. 13. Without and with the use of the compromised wireless interface
IP authentication mechanism, the utilization of the wireless bandwidth in the
static environment.
When our proposed authentication mechanism is implemented,
as can be seen from Fig. 13(b), significant reduction of UDP
flooding was resulted. This is because since the SMR offers
four authentication packets, and when it monitors a large
proportion of non-purposeful UDP packets, it quickly triggers
a switch of the wireless interface. In this way, the SMR
is able to inform the SAR about the compromised wireless
interface IP address. Then the SMR and the SAR switch the
wireless interface to CUCC FDD-LTE to continue the live
video services for the user.
Comparing to the case without the authentication mecha-
nism, as shown in Fig. 14, the effect caused by the attack
is shorten to about 10 seconds. More importantly, the SAR
can gain knowledge about the existence of an attack, this
knowledge can be useful for further security actions.
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Fig. 14. The mitigation effect of the compromised wireless interface IP
authentication.
B. Experiment and Result in High Speed Moving Environment
In the high speed moving environment, we use our de-
veloped SMR shown in Fig. 15 and the SAR deployed in
the information technology center on our campus. In the
experiment, the SMR is deployed on a high-speed train (350K-
m/h) on the Beijing-Shanghai express railway. We install
three 3G/4G wireless interfaces (i.e. CMCC TD-LTE, CUCC
WCMDAnFDD-LTE and CTCC EV-DO) in the SMR.
Fig. 15. The used SMR in the high speed moving environment.
In order to test the new wireless interface IP authentication
mechanism, we repeat the packets from the SMR at the ingress
of our campus information technology center to simulate the
replayed attack from the PN while the train is moving and the
authentication mechanism is working. The repeat operation
lasts about 20 minutes. During the 20 minutes, we turn
off the authentication mechanism for 3 minutes to observe
the benefits of the authentication mechanism. As shown in
Fig. 16, once the authentication mechanism is turned off, all
the three wireless interfaces fail to receive the data which
indicates transmission disruption due to the replayed attack.
As soon as the authentication mechanism is resumed, the SAR
immediately distinguishes the outdated wireless interface IP
addresses from the normal ones and the wireless bandwidth
consumption returns back to the normal range.
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Fig. 16. The fluctuation of the wireless bandwidth between the SMR and
the SAR in the high speed moving environment.
We also record the packet loss rate performance in Fig. 17.
When the authentication mechanism is turned off, the SAR
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fails to trace the correct wireless interface IP addresses of
the SMR and consequently returns most of the packets to
the outdated IP addresses claimed by the repeat operation.
Therefore, the packet loss rates obtained from the moving
SMR increase drastically. With the resumption of the new
wireless interface IP authentication mechanism at the 10th
minute shown in Fig. 17, the packet loss rates decrease
immediately. We further record the corresponding RTTs in Fig.
18. In our measurement, we cap the RTT measures to 5000ms
as any RTT measure exceeding the cap simply indicates an
abnormal event. We can see from Fig. 18 that most RTT
measures give 5000ms when the authentication mechanism is
turned off.
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Fig. 17. The fluctuation of the packet loss rate in the high speed moving
environment.
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To test the effectiveness of the proposed authentication
mechanism against flooding attack from the PN while the
train is moving. We simulate the attack by duplicating the
packets from the SAR at the egress of our campus information
technology center. The duplication operation lasts for about 5
minutes. In Fig. 19(a), we first show the results without the
authentication mechanism. We can observe that most of the
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Fig. 19. Without and with the use of the compromised wireless interface
IP authentication mechanism, the utilization of the wireless bandwidth in the
high speed moving environment.
wireless bandwidth is occupied by the duplicated packets, and
user traffic only utilizes less than 5%. Since the authentication
mechanism is turned off, such a low utilization of user traffic
continues right through the flooding attack. Fig. 19(b) shows
the throughput performance of the compromised wireless in-
terface IP with the proposed authentication mechanism. When
the SMR receives too much non-purposeful data and detects
low wireless bandwidth utilization, the SMR informs the SAR
about the compromised wireless interface IP address and seeks
a new wireless interface to relay the service. The SMR changes
the wireless interface IP address 6 times in this experiment
which saves more than a half wireless bandwidth consumption
during the flooding attack.
C. Performance Comparison and Randomness Test
We further compare the performance of our proposed au-
thentication mechanism with both the hash chain based and the
existing chaotic map based authentication mechanisms. Fig.
20 shows the communication overheads of these mechanisms
measured by the number of interactions between the SMR and
the SAR. For the existing chaotic map based mechanism, its
communication overhead is at least two times of the hash chain
based mechanism and our proposed solution. This is because
of that the OTPs in the hash chain based mechanism and our
proposed solution can be derived sequently using the original
seed or initial states in the algorithms. In contrast, the existing
chaotic map based mechanism needs to update the initial states
timely when an OTP is sent and validated.
While the hash chain based mechanism has similar low
overhead compared with our proposed approach, it is less
secure than both our proposed approach and the existing
chaotic map based mechanism when using the same OTP
length. According to the definition of cryptosystem’s security
level, if the fastest way to break the system is the exhaustive
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Fig. 20. The communication overheads of different authentication mecha-
nisms.
key search and the key is an uniformly distributed random N -
bit value, then the security level is traditionally said to be N .
Therefore, using the same OTP length of N bits and assuming
that the OTPs behave like uniformly distributed random N -bit
value in the existing mechanisms, the security level of the hash
chain based mechanism is 0:5N [38] due to the birthday attack
and the security level of chaotic map based mechanism is N .
Although we have proven the randomness of our mechanism’s
OTP in Section IV, here we test its randomness again using
the NIST Statistical Test Suite [41]. We capture and use 100
groups of 1-Mb OTP streams. The corresponding test items
and results are summarized in Table 1 which confirms the
randomness of our RNG. These test items investigate the
randomness of the OTP using different mathematical methods.
Therefore, we can conclude that the security level of our
mechanism is N .
TABLE I
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF AMS.
NIST randomness tests The average of P-value Pass rate
Frequency 0.5276 99%
Block Frequency 0.4645 98%
CuSum-F 0.5410 99%
CuSum-R 0.5620 96%
Runs 0.5253 98%
Long Runs of Ones 0.4619 98%
Rank 0.4694 97%
Universal 0.5371 100%
Approximate Entropy 0.4888 100%
Non Overlapping Template 0.5199 100%
Linear Complexity 0.5145 100%
Random Excursions 0.5288 98%
Random Excursions Variant 0.4887 97%
Fig. 21 shows the security properties of different authen-
tication mechanisms. Since our OTP solution behaves like
uniformly distributed random N -bit value, the only way to
break the proposed authentication mechanism is by using the
brute-force attack. With 16-Byte and 20-Byte OTPs, our
authentication mechanism can withstand an exhaustive OTP
search at the rate of 1038.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the data delivery security of
SCN-R with practical considerations in high-speed trains. We
first concluded that an authentication mechanism was needed
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to protect SCN-R under replay/spoofing attacks and UDP
flood attacks. However, since the lifetime of a connection
session was short in our scenario, the existing authentication
mechanisms that were unsuitable for our scenario due to their
complicated handshake and lengthy procedure. We addressed
the issue by seeking a lightweight approach for authentication.
We proposed a new chaos-based random number generator to
build the one-time used passwords. An efficient authentication
mechanism was designed using a pair of random number
generators. Our approach overcome some shortcomings of
the existing lightweight authentication. Particularly, our ap-
proach addressed the vulnerability of the hash based approach
and reduced the intercommunication overhead of the existing
chaos-based approach. We implemented our solution and per-
formed extensive experiments to show the effectiveness of our
authentication mechanisms against attacks. We demonstrated
that an attempt to compromise a wireless interface IP address
can be detected and rectified to minimize the performance
degradation.
While our proposed authentication solution was shown to be
effective in our considered application, the solution is immedi-
ately applicable also to other scenarios where communication
resources are very limited and connections are lossy such as
IoT networks.
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